Standing to Sue in Colorado: A State of Disorder by Merrick, Glenn Warren
Denver Law Review 
Volume 60 Issue 3 Article 2 
February 2021 
Standing to Sue in Colorado: A State of Disorder 
Glenn Warren Merrick 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Glenn Warren Merrick, Standing to Sue in Colorado: A State of Disorder, 60 Denv. L.J. 421 (1983). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
STANDING To SUE IN COLORADO: A
STATE OF DISORDER
GLENN WARREN MERRICK*
An increasing number of Colorado litigators are discovering that they
are confronted with the threshold issue of standing to sue in state court in a
significant number of cases, especially when public law questions are in-
volved.' Unfortunately, one need invest only a modest amount of time in
the law library to discover that the law of standing is a labyrinth of com-
pounding confusion. A tempting inference is that the left judicial hand is
ignorant of what the right has done, and that standing is frequently a device
of expedience-a mechanism for sidestepping issues that the court finds
unattractive. This article does not pretend to provide a compass to guide
lawyers and jurists successfully through the maze; rather, its purpose is to
analyze the current state of the law of standing in Colorado, to offer some
comparisons to federal Supreme Court jurisprudence, 2 and to spotlight some
of the more vexing problems which remain unresolved.
I. THE SOURCE AND TEST FOR STANDING
The bedrock case upon which most of the recent Colorado decisions rely
for the expression of state standing principles is Wl'mbery v. Ettenberg. 3 In
Wimberly, a number of bail bondsmen filed suit seeking to enjoin the opera-
tion of a program that permitted certain defendants to deposit a sum of cash
equal to ten percent of the total amount of their bail to obtain pre-trial
release. The Wmbery plaintiffs claimed that this program had driven them
to the brink of bankruptcy. On appeal, after the district court had entered
an order enjoining operation of the program, the Colorado Supreme Court
took the opportunity to address the law of standing.
* B.A., University of Colorado, 1976; J.D., University of Texas, 1979. Currently an as-
sociate with Davis, Graham & Stubbs in Denver, Colorado.
1. As a practical matter, standing issues arise less frequently when the suit seeks to chal-
lenge private action having limited consequence beyond the parties. See generally C. WRIGHT,
LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 13, at 43 (3d ed. 1976).
2. The law of standing in the federal courts is equally enigmatic; it has baffled some of the
best legal scholars and has troubled the Supreme Court on several occasions. Writing for the
Court in Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970), Justice
Douglas stated: "Generalizations about standing to sue are largely worthless as such." Chief
Justice Warren's majority opinion in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), quoted Professor
Freund for the proposition that standing is one of" 'the most amorphous [concepts] in the entire
domain of public law.' " Id. at 99 (quoting Hearings on S 2097before the Subcomm. on Constitutwtnal
Rights ofthe Senate ]udciary Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 498 (1966) (statement of Prof. Paul A.
Freund). Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion in United States ex rel. Chapman v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953) describes standing as a "complicated speciality of
federal jurisdiction." More recently, in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982), the majority recognized that
"the concept of 'Art. III standing' has not been defined with complete consistency in all of the
various cases decided by this Court which have discussed it.
3. 194 Colo. 163, 570 P.2d 535 (1977).
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First, the justices made it clear that standing in the state courts has its
wellspring in article III of the Colorado Constitution, 4 which mandates sepa-
ration of powers between the three branches of government. The court ex-
pressed the importance of this constitutional separation of powers basis for
the standing doctrine, quoting Ex-Cell-O Corp. v. Cito of Chicago:
5
[T]his power of judicial determination is delicate in character
. ..for it may result in disapproval of acts of. . .both co-ordinate
branches of government. This care .. .has been proverbially ob-
served by the courts, lest ...they exceed their judicial authority
and invade the fields of policy preserved to the legislative arm or to
the realm of administrative discretion lodged in the executive
branch .... 6
In addition to the constitutional substructure undergirding the standing doc-
trine, the Wimberly court remarked that: "[J]udicial self-restraint, based upon
considerations of judicial efficiency and economy, also supports the
doctrine."
7
The court then turned its attention to formulating the proper test for
standing. Justice Erickson, writing for the court, recognized that the United
States Supreme Court has formulated a two-prong test for standing in Associ-
ation of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp.8 The test articulated in
Data Processing requires that the plaintiff allege that the challenged provision
or conduct caused him injury in fact, and that the injury sought to be pro-
tected is arguably within the zone of interest to be protected or regulated by
the statute or constitutional guarantee in question. 9 The Wimberly court
agreed that standing involves a two-prong inquiry and conformed the first
prong of the state standing test to that set forth in Data Processing-the plain-
tiff must have suffered injury in fact.' 0 However, the justices rejected the
second part of the Data Processing test. In place of the "zone of interest"
inquiry, the Wimberly court substituted the more stringent "legal interest"
test. That is, to determine whether the plaintiff has standing to sue, the
4. COLO. CONsT. art. III, provides:
Distribution of Powers
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct depart-
ments,-the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of persons
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments
shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this
constitution expressly directed or permitted.
5. 115 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1940).
6. 194 Colo. at 167, 570 P.2d at 538 (quoting Ex-,Ce//-O, 115 F.2d at 629). Accord McCros-
key v. Gustafson, 638 P.2d 51, 54 & n.3 (Colo. 1981). But cf. Conrad v. Denver, 656 P.2d 662,
668 n.5 (Colo. 1982) (suggesting that separation of. powers concern may be separate and distinct
from the test for standing to sue).
7. 194 Colo. at 167, 570 P.2d at 539. Accord McCroskey v. Gustafson, 638 P.2d 51 (Colo.
1981).
8. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
9. 1d. at 153. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970), a companion case decided the same
day as Data Processbng, repeated this two-prong standard. Id at 164.
10. 194 Colo. at 168, 570 P.2d at 539. Strictly speaking, Data Processing requires only an
allegation of injury in fact. 397 U.S. at 162. Subsequent cases, however, have frequently re-
stated this aspect of the federal test for standing in terms of plaintiff "showing" that he has been
injured in fact. See in/a notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
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court must decide whether the interest advanced is legally protected. 1
This dissimilarity between the second prongs of the Data Processing and
Wimberly standing tests is significant. The Data Processing Court expressly
rejected the "legal interest" inquiry because it goes to the merits; the justices
viewed standing issues as quite distinct and preliminary to the merits.' 2 The
Wimberly tribunal disagreed:
In our view, a decision on the merits is always inextricably tied to
every case which involves the issue of standing ....
The typical lawsuit raises three questions: (1) whether the
plaintiff was injured in fact, (2) whether the injury was to a legally
protected right, and (3) whether the injury resulted from the al-
leged action of the defendant. Courts in different jurisdictions may
choose to address any or all of these questions as part of the inquiry
on standing. But we deem the more reasonable approach to be to
address only the first two questions in the context of standing.
Those two questions can be decided by the court as a matter of law
in the preliminary inquiry on standing. The third question is prop-
erly reserved for the trier of fact and is the primary question to be
resolved on the merits.
13
With the standing test thus formulated, the Wimberly court went on to
hold that the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy either aspect of the test. First, the
damage sustained by the bail bondsmen was characterized as "indirect and
incidental pecuniary injury," and such an injury was deemed insufficient to
constitute injury in fact. 14 Second, the plaintiffs could not point to a statu-
tory or constitutional provision protecting them against competition from
bail alternatives. i
5
It is important to distinguish between the theoretical underpinnings of
the federal standing doctrine and the separation of powers basis for standing
articulated in Wimber'y. In the federal courts, standing is but one of several
doctrines, comprising the concept of justiciability under which may preclude
a federal court from deciding a case because the issue is not yet ripe, involves
11. By appending this second criterion as a part of the Colorado test for standing, the
Wimberly court removed Colorado from the majority of states in which one need only suffer
injury in fact to possess standing unless a statute or "public policy" requires otherwise. One
leading commentator has described this majority view as "both simple and satisfactory" in com-
parison to the complicated federal law of standing. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 22.00-4, at 722 (Supp. 1970).
12. 397 U.S. at 153.
13. 194 Colo. at 168, 570 P.2d at 539. It is interesting that the Wimberly court did not
mention a case that had been decided only five years earlier and which had articulated the two-
prong standing test in the dtjunctwe. In Colorado Chiropractic Ass'n v. Heuser, 177 Colo. 434,
438, 494 P.2d 833, 834 (1972), the court had said that standing required a plaintiff to "show
that it is an aggrieved party or that it is a party whose interest the statute was designed to
protect." (emphasis added).
14. 194 Colo. at 168, 570 P.2d at 539. But see Board of County Comm'rs v. Thornton, 629
P.2d 605, 609 (Colo. 1981) (holding that owner of property adjacent to rezoned land has stand-
ing to challenge allegedly illegal zoning where value of property has diminished as a result of
rezoning).
15. 194 Colo. at 168-69, 570 P.2d at 539. But cf. People v. District Court, 196 Colo. 116,
117 n.2, 581 P.2d 300, 301 n.2 (1978) (holding, without explanation, that a district attorney, as




a political question, is moot, or would require the rendering of an advisory
opinion. 16 "Justiciability," in turn, is a shifting term of art' 7 used to express
the dual limitations placed on the federal courts by article III of the Consti-
tution which limits federal jurisdiction to "cases" and "controversies."
18
These dual limitations confine the federal courts to questions "presented in
an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolu-
tion through the judicial process," and they define "the role assigned to the
judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that the federal courts
will not intrude into areas committed to other branches of government.""
This explanation of justiciability demonstrates that a separation of pow-
ers maxim can give rise to nonjusticiability in the federal courts; however,
the basis for nonjusticiability is the political question doctrine rather than
standing. Both standing and the political question doctrine are embodied in
the "case" or "controversy" restriction found in article III, but each imposes
a distinct and separate limitation on the federal judiciary.
2 0
Perhaps the best expression of the difference between the principle of
standing and the political question doctrine is found in Baker v. Carr.2 1 Con-
cerning political questions, the Baker Court said: "[I]t is the relationship be-
tween the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Federal Government
. ..which gives rise to the political question. . . . The nonjusticiablity of
a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers."
22
Standing, on the other hand, involves a different issue in the federal courts:
standing requires that the litigants have "such a personal stake in the out-
come of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharp-
ens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions."'23 Similarly, in Flasi v. Co-
16. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). See also United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302,
305 (1943) (collusive suit). However, "standing" has sometimes been used by the Court as a
shorthand expression for these various other elements of justiciability. Flast, 392 U.S. at 99;
Lewis, Constitutional Rights and the Miuse of "Standing," 14 STAN. L. REV. 433, 453 (1962).
17. Justiciability is a difficult concept to understand, in part because, as the Court ob-
served in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 508-09 (1961), it is "not a legal concept with a fixed
content or susceptible of scientific verification. Its utilization is the resultant of many subtle
pressures, including the appropriateness of the issues for decisions. . . and the actual hardship
to the litigants of denying them the relief sought."
18. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1968).
19. United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396 (1980) (quoting Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968)).
20. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 215 (1974); see Simon
v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37-38 (1976). But see Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-74
(1982) (the article III standing requirement confines the federal judicial power to a role "consis-
tent with a system of separated powers").
21. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
22. Id. at 210. Accord Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518-19 (1969).
23. Baker, 369 U.S. at 204. The converse of the quote from Baker is generally not true.
Absent injury in fact, concrete adverseness and a sharp presentation of issues do not establish
standing in the federal courts. E.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 486 & n.21 (1982); Simon v. Eastern Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39-40 (1976); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739-40
(1972). But cf. United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980) (discussed more
fully in/ia note 96).
A leading treatise makes the distinction between standing and political questions suc-
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hen ,24 the Court observed that "[t]he fundamental aspect of standing is that
it focuses on theparty seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and
not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated.
25
Based on established federal principles, therefore, one would not have
expected the Colorado Supreme Court to rely on article III of the state con-
stitution as the foundation for standing. A more logical source of the stand-
ing doctrine is section 1 of article VI of the Colorado Constitution. 26 That
section limits the state courts to the exercise of "judicial power," and it can
be persuasively argued that judicial power extends only to suits evidencing a
"case or controversy" as those terms are understood in federal case law.2 7
Notwithstanding the peculiar source of the standing doctrine an-
nounced in Wimberly, almost without exception 28 the Colorado Supreme
Court has employed the Wimberly standing test. 29 But the nature of standing
in Colorado remains unclear. One decision from the state supreme court
contains an unequivocal statement that standing goes to the court's constitu-
tional jurisdiction.3 0 Another more recent decision, however, agrees that the
first part of the Wimberly test, the requirement of injury in fact, has constitu-
tional origins but states that the latter part of the test, the requirement that
the asserted interest be legally protected, is founded only in judicial
prudence.
3 '
cinctly: "Unlike the rules of standing... [the] political question doctrine purports to establish
that a particular question is beyond judicial competence, no matter who raises it .. " 13 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3534, at 297 (1975).
24. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
25. Id. at 99 (emphasis added).
26. COLO. CONST. art. VI, § I provides in pertinent part:
Section 1. Vestment ofjudicial power. The judicial power of the state shall be
vested in a supreme court, district courts, a probate court in the city and county of
Denver, a juvenile court in the city and county of Denver, county courts, and such
other courts or judicial officers with jurisdiction inferior to the supreme court, as the
general assembly may, from time to time establish ....
27. Indeed in Theobald v. Board of County Comm'rs, 644 P.2d 942, 950 (Colo. 1982), the
court indicated that absent "an actual controversy for adjudication," plaintiffs lack standing.
Accord Conrad v. Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 668 (Colo. 1982).
28. Aside from the special standing test for taxpayers suing on behalf of a municipality
announced in McCroskey v. Gustafson, 638 P.2d 51 (Colo. 1981), the only aberration in the
supreme court's decisions appears in a footnote in R. McG. v. J.W., 615 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1980),
wherein the majority stated that standing problems may be analyzed using the test announced
in Data frocessing: "(a) whether the party alleges... injury in fact; and (b) whether the interest
sought to be protected is arguably within the zone of interests encompassed by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in question." Id. at 668 n.3. Data Processing and Wmberly were both
cited for this proposition, despite the fact that Wimberly had expressly rejected the Data Processing
formulation of the standing test.
29. Conrad v. Denver, 656 P.2d 668, 667-68 (Colo. 1982); Board of County Comm'rs v.
Thornton, 629 P.2d 605, 608 (Colo. 1981); Colorado Springs v. Board of Trustees of the Fire-
men's Pension Fund, 626 P.2d 1122, 1126 (Colo. 1980); Marco Lounge, Inc. v. Federal Heights,
625 P.2d 982, 984 (Colo. 1981); Cloverleaf Kennel Club, Inc. v. Colorado Racing Comm'n, 620
P.2d 1051, 1055-59 (Colo. 1980); Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 1374, 1380
(Colo. 1980); Dodge v. Department of Social Serv., 198 Colo. 379, 380, 600 P.2d 70, 71-72
(1979)..
30. Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 1374, 1379 (Colo. 1980). Accord Mc-
Croskey v. Gustafson, 611 P.2d 984, 986 (Colo. App. 1980), afd, 638 P.2d 51 (Colo. 1981).
31. Conrad v. Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 668 (Colo. 1982); accord McCroskey v. Gustafson, 611
P.2d 984, 986 (Colo. App. 1980), af'd, 638 P.2d 51 (Colo. 1981). This statement from Conrad is
analogous to the rule in federal courts that although article III of the federal Constitution un-
dergirds the injury-in-fact requirement of standing. Eg., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455
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II. INJURY IN FACT
The purposes served by the injury in fact requirement are said to be
threefold. First, it insures a complainant will zealously present a complete
perspective of the adverse consequences flowing from the specific set of facts
underlying the grievance. Second, it guarantees that judicial review is neces-
sary to protect the complaining party's interests. Third, it assures that any
relief granted will be no broader than is required by the facts giving rise to
the dispute.
3 2
Plaintiffs in the Colorado courts can establish the injury in fact require-
ment in a variety of circumstances. 33 The Colorado Supreme Court has said
that the injury need not be direct, economic harm;3 4 intangible loss can be
U.S. 363, 372 (1982); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,
441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973),
the second prong of Data Processing, the "zone of interest" requirement, is a nonconstitutional
limitation to be applied only in appropriate circumstances. E.g., Valley Forge Chr ttn College,
454 U.S. at 474-75; Gladstone, Realtors, 441 U.S. at 100 n.6; Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39 n.19 (1976). See also Wiznberly, 194 Colo. at 166, 570 P.2d at 538.
The drawing of these distinctions is often difficult as the Valley Forge Christian College major-
ity recently remarked:
[I]t has not always been clear in the opinions of this Court whether particular features
of the "standing" requirement have been required by Art. III ex proprio vigore, or
whether they are requirements that the Court itself has erected and which were not
compelled by the language of the Constitution.
454 U.S. at 471.
32. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221-22 (1974). Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Sepa-
ration of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982) also identifies three implicit policies of
article III served by the requirement of "actual injury redressable by the court." First, it assures
that legal questions are resolved in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic apprecia-
tion of the consequences ofjudicial action. Second, it insures that one decision will not pave the
way for other lawsuits which have some but not all of the same facts. Finally, it guarantees that
the federal courts do not simply become vehicles for the value interests of concerned bystanders.
Id. at 472-74.
33. By comparison, the United States Supreme Court has allowed important rights to be
vindicated when plaintiffs had no mcre stake in the outcome of the suit than a fraction of a
vote, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); a five dollar fine and costs, see McGowan v. Mary-
land, 366 U.S. 4240 (1961); and $1.50 poll tax, see Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966). In United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973), the Court stated: "The basic idea
that comes out in numerous cases is that an identifiable trifle is enough for standing to fight out
a question of principle: the trifle is the basis for standing and the principle supplies the motiva-
tion." Id. at 689 n.14 (quoting Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Cm. L. REV. 601, 613
(1968)).
The principal exception to this "trifle" theorem involves suits challenging the legality of
federal expenditures wherein standing is predicated solely upon taxpayer status. In these cases
the Court has ruled that "the interests of a taxpayer in the moneys of the federal treasury are
too indeterminable, remote, uncertain and indirect to furnish a basis for [standing]." Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and States, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 478, 761 (1982) (quoting Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 433 (1952)). See
also Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464,478-79 (1938); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S.
447, 487 (1923). Despite the potentially significant stake of major corporate taxpayers in the
federal treasury, see Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 497 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting),
this genre of taxpayer litigation founders on standing shoals unless the taxpayer can meet both
of the special criteria for maintaining these suits announced in Fast. See infra notes 107-09 and
accompanying text.
34. Dodge v. Department of Social Serv., 198 Colo. 379, 382, 600 P.2d 70, 71-72 (1979)
(citing United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973)); accord Conrad v. Denver, 656 P.2d 662,
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sufficient injury to meet the initial Wmberly criterion. 35 It is also clear that
the injury may be prospective under Colorado law. In CF&I Steel Corp. v.
Colorado Air Pollution Control Commission,36 the court remarked that "the
proper inquiry to be made as to the injury in fact requirement is 'whether
the action complained of has caused or threatens to cause injury in fact' to the
plaintiff."'37 In this respect the law of standing in state court is consistent
with the rule that has developed in federal court 38 notwithstanding the sig-
nificant doctrinal difficulties evident in federal law.3 9 On the other hand,
when the Colorado Supreme Court has deemed the threatened injury to be
too remote and abstract to prevent "an actual controversy for adjudication,"
it has ruled that the plaintiffs lack standing.4° What remains unclear is how
immediate the injury must be to confer standing.
The most notable recent Colorado case addressing the requirement of
668 (Colo. 1982); Olson v. State Bd. for Community College and Occupational Educ., 652 P.2d
1087 (Colo. App. 1982), cert. granted, VI BRIEF TIMES RrTR. 975 (Colo. Oct. 18, 1982) (No.
82SC27 1). See also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env'tl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 73-74
(1978); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261-63 (1977); Traf-
ficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 206
(1962). Cf. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (posting of the Ten Command-
ments on the walls of public classrooms); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (systematic exclu-
sion of blacks from juries).
35. Cloverleaf Kennel Club, Inc. v. Colorado Racing Comm'n, 620 P.2d 1051, 1058 (Colo.
1980) (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)). See also supra note 34.
36. 199 Colo. 270, 610 P.2d 85 (1980).
37. Id. at 279, 610 P.2d at 92 (emphasis in original) (quoting Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 194
Colo. 163, 570 P.2d 535 (1977)). CF&ISteel Corp. deals principally with the related doctrine of
ripeness. For a brief analysis of the interplay between standing and ripeness in this case, see
Note, PAe-Enforcement Judicial Review: CF&I Steel Corp. v. Colorado Air Pollution Control
Comm'n, 58 DEN. L.J. 693 (1981).
38. Threatened injury is sufficient in the federal courts as well. See, e.g., Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464
(1982); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979); Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 499 (1975); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974); Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,
410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 14 (1972); Doremus v. Board of Educ.,
342 U.S. 429, 434 (1951); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 448 (1923). However, in Laird
the United States Supreme Court held that subjective injury is insufficient; the federal com-
plaint must allege a claim of present, objective harm or a threat of future objective injury. 408
U.S. at 13-14. In Frothingham, a unanimous Court stated that prospective damage will not suf-
fice to support standing unless it is threat of "immediate" injury. 262 U.S. at 488.
39. Complicated justiciability problems can arise in federal court when threatened harm is
the basis for injury in fact. Article III does not empower federal judges to adjudicate "abstract"
or "hypothetical" claims. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 332-33 & n.9 (1977); O'Shea v. Lit-
tleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495 (1974); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1969); United Pub.
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-91 (1947); but cf. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 6 n.7
(1977) (challenge to limitation on student loans permitted on assertion that litigant "may re-
quire" such a loan). But " '[o]ne does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury
to obtain preventative relief. If the injury is certainly impending, that is enough.' " Babbitt v.
United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (quoting Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593 (1923)); accord Regional Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 143
(1974). Nevertheless, "[a] plaintiff who challenges a statute must demonstrate a realistic danger
of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute's operation or enforcement." Babbitt, 442
U.S. at 298; cf O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 494 (plaintiff need only allege such danger of injury). The
Babbitt Court summarized the difficulty of balancing the competing justiciability constituents
when the plaintiff complains of threatened harm as follows: "The difference between an ab-
stract question and a 'case or controversy' is one of degree, of course, and is not discernible by
any precise test." 442 U.S. at 297.
40. Theobald v. Board of County Comm'rs, 644 P.2d 942, 950-51-(Colo. 1982).
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injury in fact is Cloverleaf Kennel Club, Inc. v. Colorado Racing Commission,
4 1
where the court reexamined the distinction it had drawn in Wi'mberl be-
tween "direct" and "indirect" economic injury. The plaintiff kennel clubs
were seeking review of a decision by the Colorado Racing Commission to
grant additional racing days to a competing kennel club; the plaintiffs
claimed that the grant was in excess of the power vested in the Commission
under the Colorado Racing Act. The district court granted defendants' mo-
tion to dismiss for want of standing, and the Colorado Court of Appeals
affirmed.
Writing for a unanimous court on review of the court of appeals deci-
sion, Justice Dubofsky returned to the Wimberly distinction between direct
economic loss and indirect and incidental pecuniary injury.42 According to
the Cloverleaf Kennel Club court, direct economic loss, in contradistinction to
indirect loss, comprehends "out of pocket" losses, "direct, palpable economic
injury" or an adverse impact on revenues. 43 Of greater significance, how-
ever, is the fact that in a footnote the court implicitly overruled part of the
Wmbery holding while ostensibly following that decision. That footnote de-
clares that even indirect economic loss is actionable if the plaintiff can point
to statutory protection against such harm.
4 4
The court then turned its attention to the court of appeals' holding that
economic injury from lawful competition can never confer standing to chal-
lenge the legality of agency action. The justices disapproved the lower
court's interpretation of earlier precedent, and stated that there is no per se
rule that economic impact from lawful competition is never sufficient to sat-
isfy the first prong of the Wimberly test. Rather, such an injury can suffice to
confer standing if the economic interest is legally protected. 4 5 The court
held, however, that the Cloverleaf Kennel Club plaintiffs lacked standing be-
cause, inter ah'a, they had failed to allege sufficiently the adverse conse-
41. 620 P.2d 1051 (Colo. 1980).
42. It will be recalled that W'nberly held that indirect and incidental pecuniary damage is
insufficient to constitute "injury in fact." 194 Colo. at 168, 570 P.2d at 539.
43. 620 P.2d at 1057. See also Augustin v. Barnes, 626 P.2d 625, 629 (Colo. 1981).
44. 620 P.2d at 1057 n.8; see also Conrad v. Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 668 (Colo. 1982). The
broadening scope of fiscal loss sufficient to constitute injury in fact is even more evident when
this language from CloverleafKennel Club is compared with older standing decisions. For exam-
ple, in Rinn v. Bedford, 102 Colo. 475, 84 P.2d 827 (1938), an attorney brought suit challenging
a state tax levied on professional services. The attorney sought to attack the statute both as a
provider and as a consumer of these services. Despite the apparent direct economic impact on
the plaintiff as a consumer of professional services, the court held that he could not attack the
statute in that role. In so ruling, the court remarked: "That the price charged him for such
services of others is fixed by the addition of the amount of the tax or any other factor does not
entitle the plaintiff to complain. He may take the service as offered or he may leave it." 102
Colo. at 479, 84 P.2d at 829.
45. Relying on federal precedent, Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968); FCC v.
Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); The Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258
(1924), Justice Dubofsky formulated the rule this way:
[Economic impact from lawful competition is not sufficient to confer standing] unless
a legislative intent to protect economic interests from competitive harm is explicit or
fairly inferable from the statutory provisions under which an agency acts or if the
legislature expressly confers standing on competitors to seek review of agency action.
620 P.2d at 1057.
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quences resulting from the award of additional racing days to their
competitor.
"Injury in fact" has additional facets, one of which was mentioned in
Wnimberly. The Winberly court perceived that Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Wefare
Rights Organization46 had bifurcated the injury in fact prong and had held
that this initial aspect of the standing test is not satisfied unless: 1) the plain-
tiff suffers injury in fact, and 2) the relief sought will redress the damage
sustained. 47 Although Wi'mberl merely described this second phase of injury
in fact without expressly adopting it, other Colorado cases such as DtLeo v.
Board of Regents of the University of Colorado48 and Lee v. People49 have denied
standing where the relief sought would not repair the alleged wrong.
50
There are also dissimilarities between federal and state law, however. For
example, despite the fact that federal decisions have often insisted upon "a
fairly traceable causal connection between the alleged injury and the chal-
lenged conduct,"' 5 1 the Colorado Supreme Court has indicated that causality
is not required to establish the threshold of standing in state court.
52
46. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
47. 194 Colo. at 167, 570 P.2d at 538. Other recent federal Supreme Court cases expressly
articulating the "redressability" requirement are Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) and Watt v. Energy
Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151, 161 (1981). This requirement has lately been refined in
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). In that case, the majority held that when the loss
threatened or suffered may derive from more than one source, the federal litigant need not
demonstrate that the loss will not be sustained; a showing that a favorable decision will likely
remove the particular source that occasioned the suit is all that is required. 456 U.S. at 243.
48. 196 Colo. 216, 590 P.2d 486 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 927 (1979). DiLeo has been
severely criticized by one commentator. See Note, Standing to Challenge Special Admi sion Programs,
50 U. COLO. L. REV. 361 (1979).
49. 170 Colo. 268, 460 P.2d 796 (1969).
50. There seems to be a significant difference between federal and state decisions with
respect to equal protection challenges. In DiLeo, the court denied standing to one seeking to
challenge a special admissions program for law school. The justices noted that if the program
were struck down, DiLeo would not benefit because he would not have qualified for admission
under the conventional admission standards. Of interest is the fact that the court was not dis-
suaded from its ruling by the possibility that if the program were declared unconstitutional, the
university might have chosen to redraft the special admissions program along non-racial lines
rather than simply eliminating it. 196 Colo. at 221, 590 P.2d at 489.
In contradistinction, the United States Supreme Court has confronted the problem of un-
derinclusive statutes, see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.24 (1976) and Stanton v. Stanton,
421 U.S. 7, 17 (1975), without denying standing merely because the legislature could choose to
cure the illegal discrimination in a manner that would not affect the plaintiff. See also Orr v.
Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 271-73 (1979). Accord Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526
(1959); Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276 (1932). This result is simply a more
particularized application of the general rule of redressability discussed in Larson. See supra note
47.
51. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env'tl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978) (quoting
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. 429 U.S. 252, 261 (1977)). Accord Larson
v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 241 (1982); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 375
(1982); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982); Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151, 161
(1981); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42, 44-46 (1976); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,505 (1975). But see United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687-89 (1973).
In Valley Forge Christian College, however, the Court described "redressability" and
"causalty" as independent parts of the article III phase of standing, separate and distinct from
the injury in fact requirement rather than merely aspects of it. 454 U.S. at 472.
52. Cloverleaf Kennel Club v. Colorado Racing Comm'n, 620 P.2d 1051, 1056 (Colo.
1981); Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 194 Colo. 163, 168, 570 P.2d 535, 539 (1977). But see Board of
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Yet another feature of injury in fact is the ill-defined concept of "partic-
ularity." The Colorado courts have on some occasions indicated that the
damage must be particularized; that is, it must be more personal than one
which is shared by a large group of potential litigants. 53 In other Colorado
cases, however, this characteristic of injury in fact has been completely ig-
nored. 54  The United States Supreme Court has also chosen to apply the
"rule" of particularity on a few occasions. 55
III. LEGALLY PROTECTED INTEREST
The second prong of the Wimberly test, whether the complaining party's
interest is legally protected, is even more perplexing. For instance, the Colo-
rado Court of Appeals has opined that mere "incidental" advantage derived
from statutes primarily designed to protect third parties is insufficient to es-
tablish the legally protected interest prong.56 Confusion also results from the
fact that in going beyond the injury in fact requirement, Wimberly and Clover-
leaf Kennel Club employ language which seems to equate standing with
whether a claim for relief has been stated. Indeed, the Wimberly court said:
"When standing is in issue, the broad question is whether the plaintiff has
stated a claim for relief which should be entertained in the context of a trial
on the merits." 57  And the Cloverleaf Kennel Club court reinforced the
equation:
Abandonment of Data Processing's rigid threshold view of
standing does not necessitate a full-scale trial on the merits before
standing disputes may be resolved. The question of whether a
County Comm'rs v. Thornton, 629 P.2d 605, 612 n.1 (Colo. 1981) (Hodges, C.J., dissenting)
(reading Wimberly and Dodge as supporting the proposition that injury in fact to private prop-
erty occurs only when there is "an injury directly resulting from the action complained of').
53. Smith v. City of Aurora, 153 Colo. 204, 385 P.2d 129 (1963); Denver v. Miller, 151
Colo. 444, 450, 379 P.2d 169, 172-73 (1963); Kolwicz v. City of Boulder, 36 Colo. App. 142, 145,
538 P.2d 482, 483 (1975). Smith and Miller involved the rule that a citizen of an unincorporated
area that is not part of a tract to be annexed by a city is not a "person aggrieved" by annexation
proceedings. Thus, such a person has no standing to bring suit under a statute authorizing suits
by persons aggrieved by the annexation proceedings. According to the Miller court, the reason
for the rule is that "[s]uch a person does not suffer, by reason of the annexation, a detriment
peculiar to himself as distinguished from the general detriment theoretically shared by all prop-
erty owners in the governmental unit." 151 Colo. at 450, 379 P.2d at 173.
54. Eg., McCroskey v. Gustafson, 638 P.2d 51 (Colo. 1981); Dodge v. Department of So-
cial Serv., 198 Colo. 379, 600 P.2d 70 (1979); Howard v. City of Boulder, 132 Colo. 401, 290
P.2d 237 (1955); Ferch v. Hansen, 115 Colo. 366, 174 P.2d 719 (1946).
55. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 482-90 (1982); Schlesinger v. Reservist Comm. to Stop the War, 418
U.S. 208, 219-21 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-79 (1974); Ex Parte
Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937). However, in Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S.
91, 99-100 (1979), the Court described this aspect of the injury in fact requirement as being a
"prudential principle by which the judiciary seeks to avoid deciding questions of broad social
import where no individual rights would be vindicated and [which] limit[s] access to the federal
courts to those litigants best suited to assert a particular claim." Accord Valley Forge Chrstian
College, 454 U.S. at 475. In United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973), the Court
remarked that "we have already made it clear that standing is not to be denied simply because
many people suffer the same injury." Accord Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
56. Intermountain Sys., Inc. v. Gore Valley/Big Horn Water Dists., 654 P.2d 872, 873
(Colo. App. 1982).
57. 194 Colo. at 168, 570 P.2d at 539. Accord Intermountain Sys., Inc v. Gore Valley/Big
Horn Water Dists., 654 P.2d 872, 873 (Colo. App. 1982).
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plaintiff has stated a claim for relief-i.e., pled facts which, if
proven, would constitute actionable injury under the relevant sub-
stantive law-may be decided, as a matter of law, antecedently to
an adjudication of the remaining merits questions (these include
any disputed issues of fact as well as such mixed questions as causa-
tion and justification of official action).
58
This equation is troublesome for at least two reasons. First, it is not
difficult to hypothesize a situation where one who apparently should have
standing fails to state a claim for relief. For example, one who has been
undeniably defrauded, but who fails to allege each of the elements of fraud is
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief, but
should not be dismissed for lack of standing. Second, the Colorado Supreme
Court has categorically stated that standing is a jurisdictional question.
59
Failure to state a claim for relief, however, is not a defect that goes to the
court's jurisdiction.
60
Cloverleaf Kennel Club does shed some light, however, on the "legally pro-
tected interest" aspect of the Wmberly formula for standing. In ascertaining
whether the second prong of the Wimberly standard had been satisfied, that
is, whether the statute protected the interests asserted, the Cloverleaf Kennel
Club court borrowed part of the test announced in Cort v. Ash 6 1 for determin-
ing whether an implied cause of action exists under a federal statute.6 2 The
Colorado court looked to: 1) whether the statute confers a right in favor of
the plaintiff; 2) whether there is any indication of legislative intent, explicit
or implicit, either to create a remedy or to deny one; and 3) whether it is
consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply
such a remedy for the plaintiff.
6 3
The utilization of the Cori factors to determine one of the integral stand-
58. 620 P.2d at 1056. Later in the opinion the court seemed to reiterate the congruency:
The standing doctrines formulated in Wtmberly guide us here: we must ascertain
whether the petitioners' complaint that the Commission favored Mile High over them
by allotting to Mile High more racing days than were allotted to the petitioners states
a claim for relief under the provisions of section 12-60-100.2, et seq., C.R.S. 1973 (now
in 1978 Repl. Vol. 5) (Racing Act).
Id. at 1057.
59. Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 1374, 1380 (Colo. 1980). Accord Mc-
Croskey v. Gustafson, 611 P.2d 984, 986 (Colo. App. 1980), a 'd, 638 P.2d 51 (Colo. 1981). But
cf. Clark v. Colorado Springs, 162 Colo. 593, 596, 428 P.2d 359, 361 (1967) (suggesting that
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief is a proper method for disposing of suits
with standing defects).
60. The equation may harbor another anomaly as well. The Colorado courts may not go
beyond the confines of the complaint in ruling on whether plaintiff has stated a claim for relief.
McDonald v. Lakewood Country Club, 170 Colo. 355, 360, 461 P.2d 437, 440 (1969); Gayton v.
Department of Highways, 149 Colo. 72, 73-74, 367 P.2d 899, 901 (1962). But if the state
supreme court adopts the federal practice, the judiciary may look to affidavits and other discov-
ery material to determine whether standing has been established. See Gladstone, Realtors v.
Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109 n.22 (1979); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501-02 (1975).
61. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
62. The only Cort factor not used by the CloverleafKennel Club court focuses upon whether
the cause of action has been traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern
of the states, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal
law. 422 U.S. at 78. This factor was obviously not applicable to the issue of standing in state
court.
63. 620 P.2d at 1058-59.
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ing criteria in Cloverleaf Kennel Club is certainly not a concept that follows
ineluctably from federal law. For as the United States Supreme Court ob-
served in Davi's v. Passman,64 there are fundamental, conceptual differences
between the traditional standing doctrine and the existence of an implied
cause of action. The prevailing federal view is that standing entails whether
the complaining party is so personally involved in the outcome as to assure a
sharp presentation of the issues.65 The existence of an implied cause of ac-
tion, on the other hand, focuses upon the nature of the right asserted rather
than the quality or extent of the injury.
66
In any event, Cloverleaf Kennel Club is almost certainly not the last word.
As the court recognized, the continued viability of the Cori test for determin-
ing whether a cause of action should be implied under federal statutes is in
doubt.67 Moreover, Cloverleaf Kennel Club is silent on whether the litmus for
determining whether an asserted interest is legally protected will evolve
64. 442 U.S. 228, 239 n.18 (1979).
65. E.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 273 (1979); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env'tl. Study
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
66. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 n.18 (1979). Cf. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 465 n.13 (1974) (stating that "[slince we hold
that no right of action exists, questions of standing and jurisdiction became immaterial.").
This distinction may not be as sharp under Colorado law. Unlike the constitutional under-
pinnings of standing in the federal courts that restrict federal court jurisdiction to "cases" and
"controversies," e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471, 474-75 (1982); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493
(1974); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968), the constitutional basis for standing in Colorado
is separation of powers. Wimber/y, 194 Colo. at 168, 570 P.2d at 538. When standing is founded
upon separation of powers, it is more logical to base a determination of standing on the resolu-
tion of whether the court ought to enforce an asserted right for a given class of litigants, at least
when that determination will arguably encroach on the domain of a co-equal branch of state
government.
67. 620 P.2d at 1058. For example, in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444
U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979), the Court said:
The question of whether a statute creates a cause of action, either expressly or by
implication, is basically a matter of statutory construction (citations omitted). While
some opinions of the Court have placed considerable emphasis upon the desirability of
implying private rights of action in order to provide remedies thought to effectuate the
purposes of a given statute (citation omitted), what must ultimately be determined is
whether Congress intended to create the private remedy asserted, as our recent deci-
sions have made clear.
Accord Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825, 1839 (1982);
Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 771 (1981).
The Court, however, does not seem to have settled on the precise formula for discerning
congressional intent. In Coutu, the majority stated that it should be ascertained from "the lan-
guage and focus of the statute, its legislative history, and its'purpose." 450 U.S. at 770. See
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979). But the factors subtly shifted in
recent cases. In California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981), the justices urged that "the four
factors specified in Cori remain the 'criteria through which [congressional intent can] be dis-
cerned.' " Id. at 293 (quoting Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979)). The Court went on
to hold, however, that the final two Cort factors are only relevant where the first two factors
indicate an intent to create a private remedy. 451 U.S. at 297-98. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981), on the other hand, recites that "[c]ongressional intent
may be discerned by looking to the legislative history and other factors: e.g. the identity of the
class for whose benefit the statute was enacted, the overall legislative scheme and the traditional
role of the states in providing relief." In Middlesex County Sewage Auth. v. National Sea
Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13 (1981), the Court remarked: "We look first ... to the statutory
language, particularly to the provisions made therein for enforcement and relief. Then we re-
view legislative history and other aids of statutory interpretation .... "
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with the developing federal standard for deciding whether a cause of action
should be implied under federal statutes.
Of perhaps greater significance, however, is the fact that CloverleafKennel
Club indicates that the Colorado courts look to the Cori factors to determine
whether an asserted interest is protected under legislation. But the Colorado
appellate courts have not yet clearly indicated how the lower courts are to
determine whether an asserted interest is legally protected when a would-be
suitor claims that the interest is protected under the federal or state constitu-
tions. It is noteworthy, therefore, that the United States Supreme Court has
ruled in Davis that the Cort test should not be used to determine whether a
cause of action should be implied under the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. 68 The Davis Court pointed out that "the question of who may
enforce a statutoy right is fundamentally different from the question of who
may enforce a right that is protected by the [federal] Constitution." 69 The
Court went on to suggest that an implied cause of action should be presumed
from federal constitutional restrictions:
At least in the absence of "a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate political department,"
Baker v. Cart, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), we presume that justiciable
constitutional rights are to be enforced through the courts. And,
unless such rights are to become merely precatory, the class of those
litigants who allege that their own constitutional rights have been
violated, and who at the same time have no effective means other
than the judiciary to enforce these rights, must be able to invoke
the existing jurisdiction of the courts for the protection of their jus-
ticiable constitutional rights.
70
Therefore, if the existence of an implied cause of action is the touch-
stone for whether an asserted interest is legally protected, Davrs suggests that
the second prong of the Wimberly standing formula is more easily satisfied
when litigants assert federal constitutional protection rather than a statutory
basis. Several Colorado cases imply a similar result when the state constitu-
tion is the alleged source of a litigant's legally protected right. 7'
It should be noted that the Cloverleaf Kennel Club opinion is also intrigu-
ing for another reason; it alludes to the legislative power to confer standing
on those who would not otherwise possess it under conventional canons. The
Colorado court relied on a classic decision from the United States Supreme
Court
72 in stating: "[Sitanding . . . 'may exist solely by virtue of statutes
68. 442 U.S. at 241.
69. Id. (emphasis in original).
70. Id. at 242.
71. Eg., Dodge v. Department of Social Serv., 198 Colo. 379, 600 P.2d 70 (1979). In Dodge
the court found that the second prong of Wt~nberly was satisfied by the simple averment that the
challenged expenditures violated a specific constitutional provision and that the defendants had
no statutory authority to expend public funds for abortions. Id. at 381, 600 P.2d at 71. See also
Conrad v. Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 668 (Colo. 1982); Olsen v. State Bd. for Community Colleges
and Occupational Educ., 652 P.2d 1087, 1089 (Colo. App. 1982), cert. granted, VI BRIEF TiMES
RPTR. 975 (Colo. Oct. 18, 1982) (No. 82SC271).
72. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). In Traffante the Court
held that a white tenant of an apartment complex had standing to sue the owner of the complex
for discrimination against nonwhites under § 810(d) of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. 42 U.S.C.
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creating legal rights the invasion of which creates standing.' ,,73 Similarly,
the power of Congress to broaden the class of those with standing to sue in
federal court is well-documented, 74 provided the article III requirement of
injury in fact has been satisfied. 75  Indeed, where congressional intent to
broaden standing to the full extent permitted by article III can be detected,
the Supreme Court has said that the judiciary is powerless to frustrate that
intent by creating prudential barriers to standing.
76
Another aspect of the legally protected interest prong concerns whose
interest must be secured. Several Colorado cases hold that a litigant does
not have standing to seek redress for damage suffered by third parties;7 7 only
those persons who have suffered the injury may litigate. 78 This principle is
not absolute, however, and the Colorado Supreme Court has recently stated
in Augusltin v. Barnes 79 that there are at least three exceptions to the general
rule:
A litigant's injury, coupled with the presence of one or more of the
following factors, may justify third party standing. First, the pres-
§ 3602(d) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). That statute permits any aggrieved person to implement the
statutory mechanism for informal resolution and to institute suit should that informal mecha-
nism fail. The Court noted that the statutory definition of "person aggrieved" is "broad"-it
includes " 'any person who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice.' "
Id. at 208 (quoting § 810(a) of the Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3602(d) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
Thus, the white tenant surmounted the standing hurdle by alleging that: 1) he had been denied
the social benefits of living in an integrated community; 2) he had been denied mixed business
and professional opportunities that would have accrued if he lived with members of minority
groups; and 3) he had suffered embarassment and economic loss in social and business activities
because he had been stigmatized as a resident of a "white ghetto." 409 U.S. at 208.
73. 620 P.2d at 1058 (emphasis in original) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500
(1975)). Two years before Cloverleaf Kennel Club was decided, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled
that the Colorado Declaratory Judgment Act, CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-51-101 to -115 (1973 &
Supp. 1982), was not a statutory grant of standing to political subdivisions and their officers to
challenge the constitutionality of state statutes. Board of County Comm'rs v. Fifty-First Gen.
Assembly, 198 Colo. 302, 305 n.1, 599 P.2d 887, 889 n.l (1979). See infra notes 102-06 and
accompanying text.
74. E.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982); Gladstone, Realtors
v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1975);
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 178 n. Il (1974); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,
493 n.2 (1974); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973); Trafficante v. Metropol-
itan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1968).
75. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979); Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 178 n.l 1 (1974); O'Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493 n.2 (1974). See also Schlesinger v. Reservist Comm. to Stop the
War, 418 U.S. 208, 224 n.14 (1974); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 n.3 (1972); Associ-
ation of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
76. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982); Gladstone, Realtors v.
Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 103 n.9 (1979).
77. E.g., Reed v. Dolan, 195 Colo. 193, 577 P.2d 284 (1978); People v. Stage, 195 Colo.
110, 575 P.2d 423 (1978); Garcia v. City of Pueblo, 176 Colo. 96, 489 P.2d 200 (1971).
78. Although litigants in federal courts ordinarily do not have standing to press the rights
of third parties eg., Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979); Village
of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263 (1977); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1973) (per curiam), this
limitation is only a prudential rule of standing that may be set aside in appropriate circum-
stances. Eg., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982); Gladstone, Realtors, 441 U.S. at 100;Arlington Heights,
429 U.S. at 263; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193 (1976); Warth, 422 U.S. at 499; Barrows v.
Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 253 (1953).
79. 626 P.2d 625 (Colo. 1981).
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ence of a substantial relationship between the claimant and the
third party . . . . Second, the difficulty or improbability that the
person who has suffered deprivation of a constitutional right will
be able to assert it. . . . Third, the need to avoid dilution of the
third party's constitutional rights if third party standing is not
permitted. 80
The result in Augus/in was not particularly surprising under federaljus
terlii standing principles.8 ' In Auguszn, vendors of life insurance policies
were permitted to challenge a Colorado Division of Insurance regulation
that required certain disclosures by insurers who replaced an existing insurer
at the insured's behest. The basis of the challenge was the insured's right to
privacy. The Auguslin court opined that the case fit comfortably within the
NAACP. v. Aabama82 mold because the moment the insured filed suit to
prevent disclosure of the replacement, the fact of the replacement would be
known to the replaced insurer. Thus, it seemed improbable that insured
parties would attempt to enforce their own rights of privacy.83 The court
also found the case analogous to Craig v. Boren,84 because plaintiff's compli-
ance with the regulation would directly result in violation of the insured's
right of privacy in those cases where the insured had requested
confidentiality.
8 5
Another exception to the rule that a litigant may predicate standing
only upon his own interests is the exception recognized in first amendment
cases. 86 In these cases, the rules of standing are relaxed to permit challenges
80. Id. at 628 (citations and footnote omitted).
81. See generaly Note, Standng to Assert Constitutionaljuts Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REv. 423
(1974). Reliance on the rights of third parties for standing in federal court is generally not
permitted unless the would-be federal litigant also sustains injury in fact. See Carey v. Popula-
tion Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 683-84 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 194-95 (1976). In-
deed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that one who suffers no injury in fact lacks
standing and cannot rely on injuries to third parties to maintain suit. Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166-67 (1972); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943) (per curiam). Actions
brought by associations as representatives of their members, see it 6 a note 99 and accompanying
text, and by the sovereign in itsparenspatriae capacity, see infra note 101 and accompanying text,
are notable exceptions to this rule.
82. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
83. 626 P.2d at 629.
84. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
85. In Craig, a vendor of 3.2% beer was allowed to assert the rights of males 18-20 years of
age in an equal protection challenge to an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to
females under the age of 18 years and males under the age of 21 years. The Court based this
result on the fact that the vendor incurred direct economic injury through constriction of the
market for beer, and the fact that the rights of males 18-20 years of age would be "diluted or
adversely affected" were the vendor's challenge to fail and the statute to remain in effect. The
Court also observed that unless the vendor were permitted to assert the rights of these third
parties, vendors of 3.2% beer might be deterred from selling beer to young males, thereby indi-
rectly violating third parties' rights. Accord Carey v. Population Serv., Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 681-
84 (1977).
86. In United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960), the Supreme Court, indictum, listed yet
another category of cases where the rights of the third parties may be asserted in federal court.
These cases all involve the issue of statutory severability. The Ranes court indicated that they
fit into four classes: 1) cases where a statute imposes criminal penalties and a decision limiting it
to situations of valid application would preclude the statute as written from giving intelligible
warning of the conduct prohibited; 2) cases where the statute has already been declared invalid
in the vast majority of its intended applications and it can be fairly said that it was not intended
to be valid in only a fraction of cases; 3) cases where the state statute under attack has already
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to the facial constitutionality of laws that may chill the freedom of expres-
sion of persons not before the court, despite the fact that application of the
law to the litigant challenging it does not offend the federal Constitution.
8 7
The reason that the Colorado court has fashioned this "overbreadth" excep-
tion, similar to the federal overbreadth rule, 88 is that "the possible harm to
society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is out-
weighed by the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted and
perceived grievances left to fester because of the possible inhibitory effects of
overly broad statutes." 89 Nevertheless, the Colorado court has said that as
the ability to narrow the applicability of a statute by judicial construction
increases, the appropriateness of allowing one within the legitimate sweep of
the statute to challenge it on overbreadth grounds diminishes. 9° Over-
breadth challenges are also less favored when the statute is neutral in its
application rather than directed at particular groups or viewpoints. 9 ' Fi-
nally, it has sometimes been said that the overbreadth doctrine may be em-
ployed only by those whose conduct is at the periphery of the activity
proscribed by legislation or regulation; it is unavailable to those whose
"speech" is clearly of a type regulated by the law in question.9 2
Several other types of lawsuits involve the assertion of the rights of per-
sons or entities not before the court. Class action litigation,93 for example,
embraces the presentment not only of the claims of class representatives, but
also of the claims of those "similarly situated." However, putative class rep-
resentatives do not have standing to press class claims in Colorado's courts
been pronounced by the state supreme court as having an otherwise valid provision or applica-
tion inextricably tied up with an invalid one; and 4) those rare cases where the court is confident
that Congress would not have desired the legislation to stand at all unless it could validly stand
in all cases. Id. at 22-23.
87. Eg., Parrack v. Town of Estes Park, 628 P.2d 1014, 1016 (Colo. 1981); Marco Lounge,
Inc. v. City of Federal Heights, 625 P.2d 982, 985 (Colo. 1981); Williams v. City & County of
Denver, 622 P.2d 542, 544-45 (Colo. 1981); Veterans of Foreign Wars, Post 4264 v. City of
Steamboat Springs, 195 Colo. 44, 48-49, 575 P.2d 835, 838-39, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 809
(1978); Bolles v. People, 189 Colo. 394, 396-97, 541 P.2d 80, 82 (1975).
88. E.g., Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980);
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 815-17 (1975); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-16
(1973); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114-21 (1972); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479,
486 (1965).
89. Marco Lounge, Inc. v. City of Federal Heights, 625 P.2d 982, 985 (Colo. 1981) (quot-
ing Bolles v. People, 189 Colo. 394, 396, 541 P.2d 80, 82 (1975)). Veterans of Foreign Wars, Post
4264 v. City of Steamboat Springs, 195 Colo. 44, 48, 585 P.2d 835, 838, appeal dsmissed, 439 U.S.
809 (1978), indicates that the more liberal standing rule adopted in first amendment cases also
results from the fact that overbroad statutes vest inordinate discretion in those charged with
enforcement and administration of their provisions.
90. Marco Lounge, Inc. v. City of Federal Heights, 625 P.2d 982, 986 (Colo. 1981). More-
over, a person whose activity is plainly and legitimately proscribed by a statute has standing to
challenge on overbreadth grounds under the first amendment if and only if the court determines
as a threshold matter of law that the statute in question is "substantially overbroad," especially
where conduct rather than pure speech is involved. Parrack v. Town of Estes Park, 628 P.2d
1014 (Colo. 1981); see Marco Lounge, 625 P.2d at 986; Williams v. Denver, 622 P.2d 542, 545
(Colo. 1981); see also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 817 (1975); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
91. Marco Lounge, Inc. v. City of Federal Heights, 625 P.2d 982, 986 (Colo. 1981).
92. People v. Bridges, 620 P.2d 1, 5 (Colo. 1980); People v. Weeks, 197 Colo. 175, 179, 591
P.2d 91, 94 (1979). But cf. Marco Lounge, Inc. v. City of Federal Heights, 625 P.2d 982, 986 n.5
(Colo. 1981) (questioning the consistency of this limitation with prior case law).
93. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23; COLO. R. Civ. P. 23.
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unless they are members of the class of injured parties. 94 A similar rule has
generally emerged in federal court 95 with some rather notable, recent clarifi-
cation involving the mooting of the representative's claim on the merits.
96
Suits prosecuted by associations on behalf of their members fit into the third-
party litigation category as well. The law of standing for actions by associa-
tions97 is not well developed in Colorado, 98 but in recent years it has under-
gone significant fine tuning in the United States Supreme Court.99 Finally,
lawsuits brought by legislators in their official capacity to challenge the le-
94. Davis v. Pueblo, 158 Colo. 319, 325, 406 P.2d 671, 674 (1965); CoLo. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
95. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 320 n.23 (1980); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502
(1975); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 32-33
(1962).
96. In Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 398-403 (1975), the Court held that a class representa-
tive whose claim was mooted after certification could continue to represent the class on the
merits. Accord Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 752-57 (1976).
Five years later the Court decided two more important cases. In Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank
v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980), the justices ruled that a purported class representative may
appeal a denial of certification after being tendered the amount of the representative's claim by
the defendant. Central to the decision was the representative's interest in spreading the attor-
neys' fees and other costs of litigation to the members of the class. This interest was deemed
sufficient to maintain a case or controversy on the certification issue. Id. at 338 & n.9. Cf.
Lyman v. Bow Mar, 188 Colo. 216, 220-21, 533 P.2d 1129, 1132 (1975) (entertaining the issue of
improper denial of certification on the basis of a possible award of legal fees).
The most remarkable of these cases, however, is United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty,
445 U.S. 388 (1980). In Geraght, a federal prisoner filed a class action suit challenging the
parole board's release rules. After the district court had denied certification and ruled against
him on the merits Gerahty filed a notice of appeal. But he was released from prison before the
appeal could be heard. Unlike the class representative in Roper, Geraghty did not argue that
certification of the class would redound to his benefit. Id. at 413-14, 417 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Nevertheless the Third Circuit held that the case was not moot, and that the lower court had
improperly refused to certify the class. On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed that
Geraghty could continue to press the "procedural claim"-the right to represent the class-
notwithstanding the expiration of his claim on the merits and the absence of alleged benefit to
him from certification. The jurisdictional case or controversy was found despite apparent moot-
ness because: 1) the merits question remained "live" between the defendants and at least some
members of the class Geraghty sought to represent, id. at 396, and 2) Geraghty's counsel vigor-
ously advocated his right to have the class certified. Id. at 403-04.
It is at least arguable that a contrary result would be reached on similar facts by the Colo-
rado courts. See generally Doe v. Seccombe, 177 Colo. 127, 493 P.2d 30 (1972).
97. Although cast in terms of "real party in interest" and "capacity to sue," Hidden Lake
Development Co. v. District Court, 183 Colo. 168, 172, 515 P.2d 632, 634-35 (1973), indicates
that the "association" must be more than a loosely formed group to be entitled to sue. That
case listed several factors for determining whether an "association" as a juridical entity exists.
Among the factors are: 1) the existence of by-laws governing the association's organization and
operation, 2) a stated purpose for existence, 3) provision for continuity despite change in mem-
bership, and 4) officers elected according to by-laws whose duties and responsibilities may be
ascertained and upon whom process can be served. Id. at 172, 515 P.2d at 635.
98. In Summerhouse Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Majestic Say. & Loan, 44 Colo. App.
495, 615 P.2d 71 (1980), the court of appeals held that a condominium association lacked stand-
ing to sue on behalf of its members to redress defective original construction because the condo-
minium declaration and by-laws did not expressly authorize such a suit. A provision in the by-
laws empowering the association to "protect and defend the condominium from loss and dam-
age by suit or otherwise" was interpreted as being limited to loss or damage sustained subse-
quent to original construction. Id. at 497, 615 P.2d at 74.
99. An association has standing to sue in federal court to redress injury to itself, and in
attempting to secure relief from such injury, the association may assert the rights of its members,
at least so long as the challenged infractions adversely affect its members' associational ties.
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975). Even in the absence of injury to itself, however, the
association may have standing to sue solely as representative of its members. Hunt v. Washing-
ton State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 342-45 (1977); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Wel-
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gality of executive conduct and policies 00 and those suits by the sovereign in
itsparenspatri'ae capacity' 0 ' are virtually unknown in the Colorado courts.
Suits by political subdivisions, or an officer thereof, challenging the con-
stitutionality of state legislation governing the political subdivision's per-
formance activate a special application of the legally protected interest
prong of the Colorado law of standing. The often-repeated rule is that such
fare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 (1976); Warth, 422 U.S. at 511-12; Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349, 355-56 n.5 (1974); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972).
In Hunt, the Supreme Court announced the current tripartite test for ascertaining whether
an association has standing to sue on behalf of its members in federal court. An association has
"representative" or "derivative" standing only when: "(a) its members would otherwise have
standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the associa-
tion's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participa-
tion of individual membes in the lawsuit." 432 U.S. at 343. See also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 320-21 (1980) (association lacks standing because free exercise case requires individual
showing of coercive effects of legislation).
100. As amended, S. 406, 53d Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (1981), would have vested members
of the general assembly with standing to enforce the public policy of the state as set forth in the
state statutes and constitution in any civil action or proceeding. The bill was vetoed by the
Governor, however, in June 1981.
See Note, CongressionalAccess to the Federal Courts, 90 HARV. L. RE'. 1632 (1977); Note, Should
Congress Defend Its Own Interests Before the Courts, 33 STAN. L. REV. 715, 718-24 (1981) for a
discussion of the few federal cases involving suits by congresspersons challenging executive ac-
tions and policies.
101. The common law concept ofparenspatrae is derived from the English constitutional
system in which the king retained certain powers and duties, known as the "royal prerogative,"
and exercised them in his role as father of the country. Traditionally, the term was used to refer
to the king's power as guardian of persons under legal disabilities, such as infants and those
mentally incapacitated, and as the superintendent of all charitable uses in the kingdom. Ha-
waii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257-58 (1972). In the United States, the "royal preroga-
tive" and the parens patriae function passed to the states. Id But see In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564
(1895); United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 367 (1888); United States v. San
Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273, 285-86 (1888) (all suits by the federal government in theparens
patriae capacity). Decisions in this country establish the right of the state to sue asparenspatriae
to prevent or repair harm to its "quasi-sovereign interests," Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. at 257-58,
but not as a volunteer merely litigating the personal claims of its citizens. Pennsylvania v. New
Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 665-66 (1976).
There is no lodestar for determining whether a "quasi-sovereign interest" is implicated. In
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907), the Court described a "quasi-
sovereign" interest as "an interest independent and behind the titles of [the state's] citizens;" in
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 592 (1923), it was said to be "an interest apart
from that of the individuals affected." It follows, therefore, that the doctrine may not be in-
voked simply because a limited class of a state's citizens is affected. Georgia v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 451 (1945). See also Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387, 394
(1938); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1923).
Although the complexities of modern life make it impossible to catalog all the interests that
can be protected under the sovereign's common law parens patriae power, the courts have enu-
merated several factors that normally determine whether an interest is sufficiently important to
permit parens patriae standing. These factors include: the size of the population adversely af-
fected, the magnitude of the harm inflicted, and the ability of those injured to obtain complete
relief without intervention of the sovereign. Puerto Rico ex rel. Quiros v. Alfred L. Snapps &
Sons, Inc., 632 F.2d 365, 369 (4th Cir. 1980); Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668, 675 (D.C.
Cir. 1976). The defendant against whom the action is brought can also be determinative. See
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); Kleppe, 553 F.2d at 673.
Although there are a number of reported cases evidencing the state's use of common law
parenspatriae authority in its ancestral sense of protecting infants and incompetents, e.g., S.A.S.
v. District Court, 623 P.2d 58 (Colo. 1981); Block v. District Court, 620 P.2d 11 (Colo. 1980);
People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127 (Colo.1980); People v. Lane, 196 Colo. 52, 581 P.2d 719 (1978),
the power has yet to be exercised beyond its primordial scope in the Colorado courts.
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plaintiffs lack standing to prosecute these suits.10 2 For although application
of the statute may "injure" the political subdivision, other competing consid-
erations generally prevent the spawning of a legally protected interest.
Among those competing considerations is the fact that "[p]ublic policy and
public necessity require prompt and efficient action from [ministerial officers
of the state]."' 10 3 Moreover, political subdivisions exist only "for the conve-
nient administration of the state government, created to carry out the will of
the state."10 4 Thus, in the absence of statutory10 5 or constitutional1 0 6 provi-
sions conferring a legally protected interest, these considerations operate to
bar suits by this potential class of litigants.
Litigation by parties relying solely on taxpayer status for standing to
challenge governmental action in state court evokes a different set of consid-
erations. With respect to suits by taxpayers alleging that public funds are
being expended illegally, the Colorado Supreme Court has held that the
Wimberly test is the appropriate test for determining standing.1 0 7 In so hold-
ing, the court expressly declined to adopt the standing test employed in fed-
eral court for taxpayer suits challenging federal expenditures' 0 8 on
constitutional grounds.'0 9 The federal test requires the taxpayer to establish
a nexus between his taxpayer status and: 1) the type of legislation chal-
lenged-the target must be an exercise of congressional power under the tax-
ing and spending clause of article I, section 8, of the Constitution (it is not
enough to attack an incidental expenditure in the administration of an es-
sentially regulatory scheme); and 2) the precise nature of the constitutional
infringement alleged-the expenditure must exceed specific constitutional
102. Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 1374, 1379-80 (Colo. 1980); Board of
County Comm'rs v. Fifty-First Gen. Assembly, 198 Colo. 302, 599 P.2d 887 (Colo. 1979); Lamm
v. Barber, 192 Colo. 511,565 P.2d 538 (1977); Martin v. District Court, 191 Colo. 107, 550 P.2d
864 (1976); Denver Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. School Dist. No. 1, 188 Colo. 310, 535
P.2d 200 (1975); Board of County Comm'rs v. State Bd. of Soc. Serv., 186 Colo. 435, 528 P.2d
244 (1974); Board of County Comm'rs v. Love, 172 Colo. 121, 470 P.2d 861 (1970); People v.
Hively, 139 Colo. 49, 336 P.2d 721 (1959); Clear Creek School Dist. RE-I v. Holmes, 628 P.2d
154 (Colo. App. 1981).
103. Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 1374, 1380 (Colo. 1980) (quoting
Ames v. People, 26 Colo. 83, 90, 56 P. 656, 658 (1899)).
104. Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 1374, 1380 (Colo. 1980) (quoting
Board of County Comm'rs v. Love, 172 Colo. 121, 125, 470 P.2d 861, 862 (1970)).
105. Eg., Board of County Comm'rs v. Denver, 194 Colo. 252, 255 & n.2, 571 P.2d 1094,
1096 & n.2 (1977).
106. See Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 1734, 1380-81 (Colo. 1980).
107. Conrad v. Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 667-69 (Colo. 1982); Dodge v. Department of Social
Serv., 198 Colo. 379, 600 P.2d 70 (1979). Although Conrad and Dodge involved expenditures
alleged to violate the state constitution, there has been no indication from the Colorado courts
that a different test is appropriate when the expenditure is alleged to offend a state statute or
federal law.
108. In federal court, taxpayer challenges of purportedly illegal expenditures by municipali-
ties are apparently governed by traditional standing principles and not by the test announced in
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923); Bradfield
v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899). In Frothingham, the Court stated that a taxpayer's interest in
the use of municipal tax monies is "direct and immediate," whereas the effect of payments out
of the federal treasury upon the future taxation of any individual taxpayer is "remote, fluctuat-
ing and uncertain." 262 U.S. at 487.
109. This test was first enunciated in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) and was reaffirmed
recently in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 478-81 (1982).
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limitations on the taxing and spending power rather than simply being be-
yond the powers delegated to Congress.1 10
When, however, suit is brought in state court on behalf of a public body
by a taxpayer seeking to vindicate a governmental right, the Wimberly test
has been found to be "not functional" because it "unduly restrict[s] taxpayer
standing in this context."11 I Rather, the Colorado court has substituted a
different two-prong test for standing. First, the governmental body must
have the right and power to bring the action, and the taxpayer must allege
that he has made a demand on the administration that has been refused.
1 
12
Second, the action must be one which the governmental body has discretion
to bring, but has refused to do so because of fraud, bad faith, or ultra vires
acts, or the governmental body must have a specifically enjoined nondiscre-
tionary duty to bring the action and has failed to do so.
1 1 3
IV. THE CHOICE OF LAW PROBLEM
The frequent divergence of the rules of standing in state court from
those which prevail in the federal system accentuates the importance of ap-
plying the correct standard. Although it is well-settled that standing to raise
state law issues in state court is a matter of state law,'' 4 standing to raise
federal issues in state court is more complicated. Certainly a state may open
its courthouse doors to those asserting federal issues who would not have
standing to sue in federal court.' The converse may not be true, however.
110. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968). Curiously, the Colorado Supreme Court in
Dodge described the Flast standing test as "similar to the criteria adopted by this Court in
Winmberly." 198 Colo. at 383, 600 P.2d at 72. Not only are the tests very different, but it appears
that the Flast Court specifically formulated its test to avoid saddling the federal courts with the
deluge of taxpayer suits that would have been generated by a more general test such as that
used in Data Processing. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text. See generally Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,
478-81 (1982).
111. McCroskey v. Gustafson, 611 P.2d 984, 987 (Colo. App. 1980), affid, 638 P.2d 51 (Colo.
1981).
112. McCroskey v. Gustafson, 638 P.2d 51, 54 (Colo. 1981). The majority described the first
part of the test as:
the functional equivalent of requiring the taxpayer to allege injury in fact to himself.
However, rather than examining the interest of the particular citizen-taxpayer who is
before the court, this test focuses upon the [governmental body's] right and power to
bring suit and its refusal to do so upon the taxpayer's demand.
Id. at 55.
113. Id. at 54. The majority stated that the second part of the test "addresses the policies of
judicial restraint and constitutional limitations on the exercise of judicial power." Id. at 55.
114. Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 47-48 (1933); Columbus & Greenville
Ry. Co. v. Miller, 283 U.S. 96, 99 (1931); Stewart v. Kansas City, 239 U.S. 14, 16 (1915);
Braxton County Court v. West Virginia, 208 U.S. 192, 197-98 (1908); Conrad v. Denver, 656
P.2d 662, 669 (Colo. 1982).
115. Bateman v. Arizona, 429 U.S. 1302, 1305 (1976) (application for bail or stay) (Rehn-
quistJ.); Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952); Comment, Protecting Fundamental
Rights in State Courts- Fitting a State Peg to a Federal Hole, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63, 91
(1977). Cf. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1001 n.2 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
(political questions).
Before the United States Supreme Court can review a case from the state courts, however,
the "case" or "controversy" requirement of article III must be satisfied. E.g., Orr v. Orr, 440
U.S. 268, 277 n.7 (1979); Bateman, 429 U.S. at 1305; Doremus, 342 U.S. at 434.
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Alhed Sores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers" 1 6 indicates that the state courts may not
deny standing to raise federal issues to litigants who would possess standing
to raise those issues in federal court.
Alied Sores involved a suit in state court challenging the constitutional-
ity of a state ad valorem tax scheme. The state had chosen to afford more
favorable tax treatment to certain nonresident owners of personal property
than that faced by resident owners of personal property. The plaintiff as-
sailed the statute on equal protection grounds under the fourteenth amend-
ment to the federal Constitution. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled
that the plaintiff lacked standing, reasoning that even if the plaintiff were
successful, the appropriate remedy would be to increase the tax liability of
nonresidents; the plaintiff's tax liability would remain unaffected. Neverthe-
less, the Ohio court went on to uphold the validity of the statutory proviso
affording more favorable tax treatment to nonresidents. On direct appeal to
the United States Supreme Court, however, standing was not seen as a prob-
lem. In the Court's language: "With the proviso thus validly remaining in
the statute it is quite immaterial that appellant's claim necessarily would fall
if it were out. It follows that appellant does have standing to prosecute its
constitutional claim." ' 1 7 The justices then proceeded to address the merits
of the claim without ever alluding to the then well-established doctrine that
the Court will not review a federal question if the state judgment is sup-
ported by an adequate and independent ruling grounded in state law." 8
Allied Stores should be contrasted, however, with Cramp v. Board of Pubhc
Instruction of Orange County.1' 9 In Cramp, a public employee attacked a state
statute requiring all state employees to execute a loyalty oath or face possible
discharge. The plaintiff attacked the statute on four federal constitutional
grounds. He claimed that the law was a bill of attainder, was an ex post facto
law, impinged on first amendment freedoms, and that the language of the
oath was so vague and uncertain as to constitute a denial of due process.
The state courts upheld the statute, although the state supreme court ap-
peared to rule that the plaintiff lacked standing to raise the first two consti-
tutional issues. Addressing the standing problem on review from the state's
highest tribunal, the United States Supreme Court assumed that if Cramp
had confined his attack against the statute to ex post facto law and a bill of
attainder grounds, the state court's ruling would have precluded the Court's
consideration of the appeal. Plaintiff, however, also attacked the statute as a
restriction of his rights of free speech and association as well as a denial of
due process. In referring to these last two arguments, the Court stated: "As
we read the opinion of the Florida Supreme Court, both of these federal
constitutional issues were decided upon their merits, without even implicit
reliance upon any doctrine of state law."' 120 The Court then proceeded to
116. 358 U.S. 522 (1959).
117. Id. at 526.
118. The doctrine had been applied as early as Murdock v. City of Memphis, 20 Wall (87
U.S.) 590 (1875) (statutory construction) and Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U.S. 361 (1893). Accord Herb
v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945); Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935).
119. 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
120. Id. at 281-82 (footnote omitted).
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the merits and struck down the statute on vagueness grounds.
The assumption in Cramp is difficult to reconcile with the quoted lan-
guage from Alied Stores.12 ' The better practice, however, is to presume that
Alhied Stores is controlling because its pronunciation on standing came in the
form of a holding rather than an assumption.
Unfortunately, the presumption that Allied Stores is the controlling au-
thority does not resolve the choice of law problem. On the one hand, A//ied
Stores can be read to dictate that state courts must employ federal standing
principles whenever the complaining party asserts violations of federally pro-
tected rights. This interpretation implies that potential litigants can ignore
state standing principles that are more restrictive than the federal law of
standing.' 22  Indeed, one of the reasons the Court has given for the recent
paring of federal jurisdiction is the sensitivity of state courts to federal consti-
tutional rights and their obligation to uphold federal law.' 23 Alternatively,
Allied Stores can be read to hold that although the state courts are free to
apply more restrictive state rules of standing, the refusal to adjudicate fed-
eral challenges in state court on standing grounds will not preclude the
United States Supreme Court from entertaining the issue on appeal if the
"case" or "controversy" requirement' 24  is satisfied.' 25  Although not
couched in terms of "standing," there is some older case support for this
second interpretation. 126 Nevertheless, this latter interpretation of Allied
121. See supra text accompanying note 117. Of course, reconciliation is not impossible. In
Alhid Stores, the Ohio Supreme Court had chosen to address the merits of the constitutional
claim, notwithstanding its ruling that the plaintiff lacked standing. Because the state court had
not considered a decision on the merits to be foreclosed by the plaintiffs lack of standing, it may
be that the United States Supreme Court, once it was satisfied that a "case" or "controversy"
existed, see supra note 114, was also free to address the constitutional claim. Cf. 13 C. WRIGHT,
A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3531, at 191-92 (1975)
(Supreme Court review of state taxpayer cases alleging federal constitutional transgressions).
122. See 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER & E. GRESSMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 4023, at 714 (1977) ("Federal standards may require recognition of standing if a
right is asserted that the state courts are obligated to protect.").
123. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976). The Colorado Supreme Court recog-
nized the obligation of the Colorado courts to uphold and enforce federal law more than 60
years ago. People v. Western Union Tel. Co., 70 Colo. 90, 94-95, 198 P. 146, 147-48 (1921).
124. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. By way of analogy, it is useful to note that
the Court has indicated that state courts cannot preclude review of a federal constitutional
claim by a more severe mootness test than is employed by the federal courts. Costarelli v.
Massachusetts, 421 U.S. 193, 197 (1975); Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301 (1964). The analogy
is made stronger by the fact that the Court has described the standing question as bearing a
"close affinity" to questions of mootness. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 n. 10 (1975).
125. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 107, at 545 (3d ed. 1976) ("Review will not
be defeated by a state court decision that a case that otherwise would turn on a federal question
is moot or that the party lacked standing to raise the federal claim.").
126. In Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276 (1932), an individual brought suit
challenging an income tax assessment under Mississippi law. The plaintiff contended that it
was a denial of equal protection under the federal Constitution to exclude income earned from
sources in other states from the taxable income of corporations, but not from the taxable income
of individuals. The state court refused to pass on the claim because it ruled that if the tax were
invalid the result would be that corporations owed more taxes, not that the plaintiff owed less.
The United States Supreme Court expressly found this an inadequate state ground to defeat its
jurisdiction to review the equal protection issue:
[Tihe Constitution, which guarantees rights and immunities to the citizen, likewise
insures to him the privilege of having those rights and ithmunities judicially declared
and protected when such judicial action is properly invoked. . . . If the Constitution
[Vol. 60:3
STANDING TO SUE
Stores suggests that the Court may be required to rule on difficult federal
constitutional issues with only minimal factual development, and in some
instances it may be incompatible with the Court's rule against reviewing
state court decisions that rest on adequate and independent state law
grounds. Furthermore, the former interpretation appears more consistent
with more recent decisions such as Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commis-
sion '2 7 and Bige/ow v. Virgi*ia.
12 8
In Boston Stock Exchange, six regional stock exchanges located outside of
New York filed suit against the New York tax commission and its members
in New York state court. Alleging discrimination against interstate com-
merce, plaintiffs assailed a provision of the New York transfer tax on securi-
ties transactions that taxed deals involving out-of-state sales more heavily
than most transactions involving sales of similar magnitude within New
York. The commission moved to dismiss, claiming that the exchanges lack-
ed standing to sue. The state trial and appellate courts disagreed. On direct
review, the United States Supreme Court, in a footnote, agreed that the ex-
changes had standing to pursue the constitutional claim. Without address-
ing whether state law might control in state courts, Justice White, writing for
a unanimous Court, cited one of the landmark federal standing decisions:
We also agree that the Exchanges have standing under the two-
part test of Data Processing Service v. Camp. . . . Appellants' com-
plaint alleged that a substantial portion of the transactions on their
Exchanges involved securities that are subject to the New York
transfer tax, and that the higher tax on out-of-state sales of such
securities diverted business from their facilities to exchanges in
New York. This diversion was the express purpose of the chal-
lenged statute. . . .The allegation establishes that the statute has
caused them "injury in fact," and that a case or controversy ex-
ists. . . . The Exchanges are asserting their right under the Com-
merce Clause to engage in interstate commerce . . .and they
allege that the transfer tax indirectly infringes on that right. Thus,
they are "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected...
by the . . . constitutional guarantee in question."'
129
exacts a uniform application of this tax on appellant and his competitors, his constitu-
tional rights are denied as well by the refusal of the state court to decide the question,
as by erroneous decision of it . . .for in either case the inequality complained of is left
undisturbed by the state court whose jurisdiction to remove it was rightly in-
voked. .... We therefore conclude that the purported non-federal ground put for-
ward by the state court for its refusal to decide the constitutional question was
unsubstantial and illusory, and that the appellant may invoke the jurisdiction of this
Court to decide the question.
Id. at 282-83 (citations omitted).
127. 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
128. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
129. 429 U.S. at 320-21 n.3 (citations omitted). Boston Stock Exchange is not dispositive be-
cause rather than holding that federal rules of standing govern in state court with respect to
federal issues, the Court may simply have been noting that it had jurisdiction to review the state
court judgment under article III of the United States Constitution. If so, however, the Court
chose to do so in an oblique fashion. Moreover, as discussed at supra note 31, the second prong
of the Data Processing test, the "zone of interest" requirement, is a prudential rule of standing
rather than a jurisdictional limitation.
Alternatively, the Boston Stock Exchange Court may have been making an observation about
New York standing precepts. The appellate division cited Data Processing as dispositive of the
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In Bigelow, an editor of a local newspaper in Charlottesville, Virginia
was convicted under a state statute that made it a misdemeanor to en-
courage or prompt the procurement of an abortion by sale or circulation of
any publication. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, and
as part of its holding ruled that Bigelow did not have standing to challenge
the statute on overbreadth grounds because his first amendment rights had
not been violated. On direct appeal, the United States Supreme Court indi-
cated that the overbreadth ruling of the state supreme court was in error,
citing federal case law.
130
Declaring a statute facially unconstitutional because of over-
breadth "is, manifestly, strong medicine," and "has been employed
by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort." Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). But we conclude that the Vir-
ginia courts erred in denying Bigelow standing to make this claim,
where "pure speech" rather than conduct was involved, without
any consideration of whether the alleged overbreadth was or was
not substantial. Id. at 615, 616. The Supreme Court of Virginia
placed no effective limiting construction on the statute. Indeed, it
characterized the rights of doctors, husbands, and lecturers as "hy-
pothetical," and thus seemed to imply that, although these were in
the noncommercial zone, the statute might apply to them, too.'31
These remarks in Bigdow are dicta, however, because the challenged
Virginia statute had been amended in the period after Bigelow's conviction.
Thus, there was no possibility that the pre-amendment form of the statute
would chill the rights of others-the issue of overbreadth had become moot
for the future. Recognizing this development, the majority expressly de-
clined to rest their decision on overbreadth grounds.
132
Regrettably, the Colorado Supreme Court has also failed to provide any
definitive assistance on resolving the choice of law problem. For whatever
reason, there are no Colorado cases squarely confronting the issue. A brief
review of some of the more recent decisions from the state's highest tribunal
demonstrates that it has provided no polestar.
Augustin v. Barnes133 involved a suit by insurance purveyors who were
standing issue. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 45 A.D.2d 365, 357 N.Y.S.2d 116,
118-19 (1974). And the New York Court of Appeals, after noting the standing dispute and the
appellate division's resolution, proceeded to the merits without further addressing the issue.
Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 37 N.Y.2d 535, 375 N.Y.S.2d 308, 337 N.E.2d 758
(1975), rv'd, 429 U.S. 318 (1977). The difficulty with this possibility, however, is that the New
York courts may have been erroneously applying federal rather than state rules of standing.
Furthermore, if the Supreme Court believed it was applying state principles of standing, the
footnote evidences a rare instance in which the Court has chosen to opine that the state court
has correctly applied its own rules.
130. 421 U.S. at 817 (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 603 (1973)). Earlier in
the Bjgelow decision, the majority had noted that the Supreme Court of Virginia had previously
recognized the appropriateness of overbreadth challenges by those whose conduct could be le-
gitimately proscribed when it stated that "persons who engage in non-privileged conduct are
not precluded from attacking a statute under which they were convicted." 421 U.S. at 816
(citing Owens v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 633, 638-39, 179 S.E.2d 477, 481 (1971)).
131. 421 U.S. at 817.
132. Id. at 818.




asserting the rights of privacy of their potential vendees. Although the Colo-
rado court recognized that the right to privacy is embedded in the federal
Constitution, it seemingly applied Colorado principles to resolve a standing
challenge. Nevertheless, however, the Colorado court frequently looked to
decisions from the United States Supreme Court in formulating and apply-
ing the appropriate state standing rules.
Denver Urban Renewal Authority v. Byrne 1 34 is in the same vein. In that
case the defendants challenged the validity of a cooperative agreement be-
tween Denver Urban Renewal Authority (DURA) and the City Council for
the City and County of Denver. The vast majority of defendants' challenges
were premised on the Colorado Constitution, but they also contended that
the agreement constituted an impairment of contracts in violation of article
I, section 11 of the federal Constitution. Nevertheless, without even consid-
ering whether different standing tests might be implicated by the various
claims, the court simply looked to the Colorado rules of standing.
Finally, DiLeo v. Board of Regents of the Universty of Colorado 135 involved an
equal protection challenge under the fourteenth amendment to the law
school's special admissions program. Once again, without pausing to weigh
the possibility of a choice of law problem, the court employed Colorado
standing principles in holding that the plaintiff lacked standing to prosecute
the claim. 1
36
These cases, however, should be juxtaposed with Marco Lounge, Inc. v.
Federal Heights.' 3 7 In Marco Lounge, the court relied upon Supreme Court
authority (and Colorado cases which, in turn, had cited United States
Supreme Court precedent) for an "exception" to standing orthodoxy recog-
nized in first amendment challenges on overbreadth grounds. This "excep-
tion" has been repeatedly recognized in the Colorado cases, 138 each of which
cite federal Supreme Court authority as the source of the more liberal stand-
ing rule applied with respect to overbreadth challenges.
139
In summary, neither the decisions from the United States Supreme
Court nor the Colorado Supreme Court afford an unshakable foundation for
deciding whether federal or state rules of standing govern when federal issues
are raised in state court. When confronted with an attack on standing,
134. 618 P.2d 1374 (Colo. 1980).
135. 196 Colo. 216, 590 P.2d 486 (1978),cert. denied, 441 U.S. 927 (1979). DiLeo is discussed
more fully at supra note 50.
136. It is evident that the DiLeo court employed Colorado rules of standing in reaching this
holding because federal principles preclude the denial of standing to raise equal protection
claims when the state can conceivably remedy disparate treatment without altering the com-
plaining party's status. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
A recent case from the Colorado Court of Appeals also looked to state law in deciding
whether to grant standing in the context of a challenge based on federal constitutional grounds.
Olson v. State Bd. for Community Colleges and Occupational Educ., 652 P.2d 1087 (Colo. App.
1982), cert. granted, VI BRIEF TIMES RPrR. 975 (Colo. Oct. 18, 1982) (No. 82SC271).
137. 625 P.2d 982 (Colo. 1981).
138. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
139. It is possible that the Colorado decisions are incorporating one aspect of the federal
standing doctrine as part of the state standing principles. If so, the intent to incorporate federal
law, as distinguished from the intent to yield to it, is tacit rather than explicit. Moreover, dicta
in Conrad v. Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 669 (Colo. 1982), suggests that the Colorado courts are
bound by federal standing rules when federal constitutional rights are asserted.
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therefore, the prudent course is to assume that the more restrictive rule gov-
erns when addressing the aspect of standing under attack, and to recite that
satisfaction of the more restrictive rule implies fulfillment of the more liberal
rule.
V. THE PROCEDURAL MECHANISM FOR CHALLENGING STANDING
Although no Colorado decisions discuss in depth the procedure for chal-
lenging standing, there are some indications that this may be yet another
area of divergence from federal law. As an initial proposition, the burden of
alleging facts sufficient to confer standing lies with the plaintiff under both
state' 40 and federal precedent.' 4 ' All material allegations in the Colorado
complaint are accepted as true, 142 and at least in federal court, the com-
plaint is construed in favor of the complaining party regardless of whether
standing is challenged by motion to dismiss' 43 or by motion for summary
judgment.' 44 Averments of injury in federal pleadings, however, must re-
flect more than the imaginable; in the words of the Court: "Pleadings must
be something more than an ingenious academic exercise in the
conceivable." '
45
A number of recent federal Supreme Court cases, however, have subtly
shifted the initial standing requirement from mere allegations of injury in
fact to a requirement that complaining parties must "show" that they have
been injured in fact.' 4 6 Indeed, the federal courts have the power to require
complaining parties to supply affidavits and other discovery material to sup-
plement the allegations of fact deemed supportive of standing.' 4 7 These
cases indicate that, at least with respect to constitutional limits on standing,
the burden on the complaining party may be heavier than simply alleging
damage; 148 proof of the factual basis of the alleged injury may be necessary
140. See, e.g., Cloverleaf Kennel Club, Inc. v. Colorado Racing Comm'n, 620 P.2d 1051,
1056-57 (Colo. 1980).
141. See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372, 377-81 (1982); Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1977); Simon v.
Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38-39 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-
99 (1975); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204
(1962).
142. Thornton v. Board of County Comm'rs, 629 P.2d 605, 609 (Colo. 1981). Cf. Bell v.
Arnold, 175 Colo. 277, 281, 487 P.2d 545, 547 (1971) (failure to state a claim); Martinez v.
Southern Ute Tribe, 150 Colo. 504, 506, 374 P.2d 691, 694 (1962) (motion to dismiss for want of
subject matter jurisdiction).
143. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). The Colorado courts construe pleadings in
favor of the complaining party when the opposing party moves to dismiss for failure to state a
claim. E.g., Bell v. Arnold, 175 Colo. 277, 281, 487 P.2d 545, 547 (1971); McDonald v. Lake-
wood Country Club, 170 Colo. 355, 363, 461 P.2d 437, 441 (1960).
144. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109 n.22 (1979).
145. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 509 (1975) (quoting United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S.
669, 688 (1973)). Accord Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 403 (1975).
146. E.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99
(1979); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261
(1977); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976); see also Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968).
147. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501-02 (1975).
148. In United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 (1973), the Court stated that if the
allegations of injury in fact are a sham, the defendant should challenge them by way of a
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as a threshold matter when standing is challenged.' 4 9 Nevertheless, a very
recent United States Supreme Court case indicates that standing is to be
resolved solely on the basis of pleading allegations. 50 In Colorado, the em-
phasis appears to be exclusively on the contentions in the pleadings. If the
complaining party merely alleges facts which state a claim for relief, the
standing hurdle is apparently surmounted.
15 1
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE TO STANDING
Even if the complaining party is denied standing to sue in the state trial
court, judicial resolution may be obtained with respect to important social
issues in the Colorado Supreme Court via the doctrine of pubhcijuris. The
paucity of cases that discuss this doctrine manifests that a thorough discourse
of its parameters is not possible; but the existing decisions do provide some
guidance. For example, the justices have said that the Colorado Supreme
Court' 52 is empowered as part of its original jurisdiction,1
53 to decide ques-
tions of manifest public importance under this doctrine when those seeking
resolution of the issues may not otherwise have access to the courts.' 5 4 The
exercise of publiciJuris is a matter of judicial discretion, however, and the
court will entertain the issues brought before it only when there are impor-
tant reasons for doing so.
15 5
motion for summary judgment where the burden of proving that the allegations are a sham
would lie with him. The Court has repeatedly held that the federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction and that the party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction must shoulder the onus of
supporting jurisdictional allegations when challenged. Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 445-
46 (1942); KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, 299 U.S. 269, 278 (1936); McNutt v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936).
149. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (providing for hearing to determine, inter a/ia, mo-
tions and defenses challenging subject matter jurisdiction); 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3531, at 71 n.84.2 (Supp. 1980).
150. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 362, 372, 377-81 (1982).
151. Conrad v. Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 668-69 (Colo. 1982); Cloverleaf Kennel Club, Inc. v.
Colorado Racing Comm'n, 620 P.2d 1051, 1056-57 (Colo. 1980). But see Colorado Chiropractic
Ass'n v. Heuser, 177 Colo. 434, 438, 494 P.2d 833, 834 (1972) (indicating that the complaining
party must make a "showing").
Strictly speaking, the case law does not foreclose the possibility that the standing inquiry
will go beyond the allegations in the complaint. Nevertheless, in the analogous situation of
determining whether the court has in personam jurisdiction under the Colorado "long-arm stat-
ute," the Colorado courts have refused to require plaintiff to do more than allege facts support-
ing a reasonable inference that defendants engaged in the conduct described in the statute. The
courts have likewise required no more than allegation of the facts even when the allegations
were controverted by affidavits. Pioneer Astro Indus., Inc. v. District Court, 193 Colo. 409, 411,
566 P.2d 1067, 1068 (1977); Alliance Clothing Ltd. v. District Court, 187 Colo. 400, 406, 532
P.2d 351, 354 (1975); Texair Flyers, Inc. v. District Court, 180 Colo. 432, 436, 506 P.2d 367, 369
(1973). But see Le Manufacture Francaise v. District Court, 620 P.2d 1040, 1042-43 (Colo. 1980)
(determination of whetherprimafacie showing of threshold jurisdiction has been established may
be based upon evidence adduced at a hearing on the motion to dismiss and the affidavits and
discovery material before the court when it rules on the motion).
152. The doctrine is not available in the state trial courts. Board of County Comm'rs v.
Fifty-First Gen. Assembly, 198 Colo. 302, 308 n.2, 599 P.2d 887, 89.1 n.2 (1979).
153. See COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
154. See Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 1374, 1379 (Colo. 1980).
155. Board of County Comm'rs v. Fifty-First Gen. Assembly, 198 Colo. 302, 308, 599 P.2d
887, 891 (1979). See also Board of County Comm'rs v. Denver, 194 Colo. 252, 255-56, 571 P.2d




Few would disagree that the doctrine of standing serves a salutary goal
in American jurisprudence. The courthouse doors should not be flung open
to anyone willing to file a complaining pleading regardless of the relation-
ship of the complaining party to the purported injury. It must be borne in
mind, however, that the Colorado and federal law of standing differ in sig-
nificant respects. Furthermore, in Colorado the doctrine of standing is
grounded in constitutionally mandated separation of powers rather than the
jurisdictional restriction to cases and controversies obtaining in federal court.
Apparently, these differences are not always appreciated by Colorado's ap-
pellate judges because there are a number of opinions which blithely adopt
axioms from the federal law of standing without considering whether these
maxims follow from article III of the Colorado Constitution.
Adding to the muddle is the fact that the hodge-podge of case law in
this state fleshing out the doctrine of standing is often confusing and fre-
quently inconsistent. Prediction can be haphazard at best. Unfortunately, it
appears unlikely that the current disarray in the law of standing will be or-
dered in the foreseeable future.
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